feat: sources wired as recency-gated injectables; transitive closure, NOT scoping, recompile-scope uninstall; targeted parse errors

BEHAVES AS transitive now emits bounded multi_hop configs (direct checks and
evidence references), fixing a silent no-op. NOT builds keep _subjectAsObject
scoping so unary predicates negate the right node, and value-typed evidence
objects gate by exact edge value. Recompiling a scope uninstalls its stale
relation configs (compileMultiple coexistence preserved). Sources become
injectable relations honored by requiredFacts with a within-X recency gate.
Duplicate definition fields and three common declaration mistakes (within on a
fact, two BEHAVES clauses, limit on a non-pattern body) now produce targeted
errors. Provider edges referencing unknown nodes are warned and dropped.

tests/DSLRuntime.test.js

@@ -205,4 +205,123 @@ describe('DSLRuntime', () => {
     // evidence's requirements, alongside the edge-traversal fact.
     assert.deepEqual(rt.requiredFacts('can_via'), ['member_of', 'can_view', 'banned']);
   });
+
+  it('negates a NOT predicate (1 - possibility)', async () => {
+    const dsl = `
+      definition Employee { id: string? }
+      fact banned(user: Employee)
+      evidence can_enter(user: Employee) { NOT banned(user) }
+    `;
+    // Absent predicate negates to allow.
+    const absent = new DSLRuntime(new Arbiter()).compile(dsl, 'rt-not-absent');
+    absent.addNode('u:1', 'Employee', {});
+    assert.equal((await absent.check('u:1', 'can_enter', 'u:1')).possibility, 1);
+    // Present predicate negates to its complement.
+    const present = new DSLRuntime(new Arbiter()).compile(dsl, 'rt-not-present');
+    present.addNode('u:1', 'Employee', {});
+    present.addRelation('u:1', 'banned', 'u:1', { possibility: 0.9 });
+    const denied = await present.check('u:1', 'can_enter', 'u:1');
+    assert.ok(Math.abs(denied.possibility - 0.1) < 1e-9, `expected 0.1, got ${denied.possibility}`);
+    // Nested inside an AND: the negated child still scopes to the subject.
+    const nested = new DSLRuntime(new Arbiter()).compile(`
+      definition Employee { id: string? }
+      definition Doc { id: string? }
+      fact owns(user: Employee, doc: Doc)
+      fact banned(user: Employee)
+      evidence can_open(user: Employee, doc: Doc) { owns(user, doc) NOT banned(user) }
+    `, 'rt-not-nested');
+    nested.addNode('u:1', 'Employee', {});
+    nested.addNode('doc:9', 'Doc', {});
+    nested.addRelation('u:1', 'owns', 'doc:9', { possibility: 0.8 });
+    nested.addRelation('u:1', 'banned', 'u:1', { possibility: 0.6 });
+    assert.equal((await nested.check('u:1', 'can_open', 'doc:9')).possibility, 0.4);
+  });
+
+  it('resolves BEHAVES AS transitive facts as bounded transitive closure', async () => {
+    const dsl = `
+      definition Employee { id: string? }
+      fact reports_to(user: Employee, boss: Employee) BEHAVES AS transitive
+      evidence can_see(user: Employee, doc: Employee) { reports_to(user, doc) }
+    `;
+    const rt = new DSLRuntime(new Arbiter()).compile(dsl, 'rt-transitive');
+    ['e:1', 'e:2', 'e:3', 'e:4'].forEach(k => rt.addNode(k, 'Employee', {}));
+    rt.addRelation('e:1', 'reports_to', 'e:2', { possibility: 1.0 });
+    rt.addRelation('e:2', 'reports_to', 'e:3', { possibility: 0.9 });
+    rt.addRelation('e:3', 'reports_to', 'e:4', { possibility: 0.8 });
+    // Direct checks on the transitive fact follow multi-hop paths.
+    assert.equal((await rt.check('e:1', 'reports_to', 'e:3')).possibility, 0.9);
+    assert.equal((await rt.check('e:1', 'reports_to', 'e:4')).possibility, 0.8);
+    // Reverse direction does not grant.
+    assert.equal((await rt.check('e:2', 'reports_to', 'e:1')).possibility, 0);
+    // Evidence references inherit the closure.
+    assert.equal((await rt.check('e:1', 'can_see', 'e:4')).possibility, 0.8);
+    // Non-transitive facts stay direct-only.
+    const direct = new DSLRuntime(new Arbiter()).compile(`
+      definition Employee { id: string? }
+      fact knows(user: Employee, peer: Employee)
+      evidence can_ping(user: Employee, doc: Employee) { knows(user, doc) }
+    `, 'rt-nontransitive');
+    ['a:1', 'a:2', 'a:3'].forEach(k => direct.addNode(k, 'Employee', {}));
+    direct.addRelation('a:1', 'knows', 'a:2', { possibility: 1.0 });
+    direct.addRelation('a:2', 'knows', 'a:3', { possibility: 1.0 });
+    assert.equal((await direct.check('a:1', 'can_ping', 'a:3')).possibility, 0);
+  });
+
+  it('bounds transitive closure depth by the fact limit', async () => {
+    const rt = new DSLRuntime(new Arbiter()).compile(`
+      definition Employee { id: string? }
+      fact reports_to(user: Employee, boss: Employee) BEHAVES AS transitive limit 2
+      evidence can_see(user: Employee, doc: Employee) { reports_to(user, doc) }
+    `, 'rt-transitive-limit');
+    ['e:1', 'e:2', 'e:3', 'e:4'].forEach(k => rt.addNode(k, 'Employee', {}));
+    rt.addRelation('e:1', 'reports_to', 'e:2', { possibility: 1.0 });
+    rt.addRelation('e:2', 'reports_to', 'e:3', { possibility: 1.0 });
+    rt.addRelation('e:3', 'reports_to', 'e:4', { possibility: 1.0 });
+    assert.equal((await rt.check('e:1', 'can_see', 'e:3')).possibility, 1.0);
+    assert.equal((await rt.check('e:1', 'can_see', 'e:4')).possibility, 0);
+  });
+
+  it('retrieves sources through providers and gates them by within recency', async () => {
+    const rt = new DSLRuntime(new Arbiter()).compile(`
+      definition Employee { id: string? }
+      definition Doc { id: string? }
+      source *session(user: Employee) within 1h
+      fact *owns(user: Employee, doc: Doc)
+      evidence can_read(user: Employee, doc: Doc) { session(user) owns(user, doc) }
+    `, 'rt-source');
+    rt.addNode('u:1', 'Employee', {});
+    rt.addNode('doc:9', 'Doc', {});
+    assert.ok(rt.relations.has('session'));
+    assert.equal(rt.relations.get('session').kind, 'source');
+    assert.equal(rt.relations.get('session').withinMs, 3_600_000);
+    // A fresh session proof grants.
+    const fresh = await rt.check('u:1', 'can_read', 'doc:9', {
+      factProviders: { session: async () => ({ possibility: 1.0, value: Date.now() }), owns: async () => 0.9 }
+    });
+    assert.equal(fresh.possibility, 0.9);
+    assert.deepEqual(fresh.providedFacts, ['session', 'owns']);
+    // A stale proof (2h old, beyond the 1h window) denies as stale.
+    const stale = await rt.check('u:1', 'can_read', 'doc:9', {
+      factProviders: { session: async () => ({ possibility: 1.0, value: Date.now() - 2 * 3600_000 }), owns: async () => 0.9 }
+    });
+    assert.equal(stale.possibility, 0);
+    assert.deepEqual(stale.missingFacts, [{ relation: 'session', reason: 'stale' }]);
+  });
+
+  it('warns about and drops provider edges referencing unknown nodes', async () => {
+    const rt = new DSLRuntime(new Arbiter()).compile(`
+      definition Employee { id: string? }
+      definition Doc { id: string? }
+      fact *owns(user: Employee, doc: Doc)
+      evidence can_read(user: Employee, doc: Doc) { owns(user, doc) }
+    `, 'rt-ghost');
+    rt.addNode('u:1', 'Employee', {});
+    rt.addNode('doc:9', 'Doc', {});
+    const res = await rt.check('u:1', 'can_read', 'doc:9', {
+      factProviders: { owns: async () => [{ src: 'ghost:1', dst: 'doc:9', possibility: 0.9 }] }
+    });
+    assert.equal(res.possibility, 0);
+    assert.equal(res.warnings.length, 1);
+    assert.match(res.warnings[0], /unknown source node 'ghost:1'/);
+  });
 });