feat: evidence composition — compile-time reference resolution for evidence sub-rules

An evidence may now reference another derived evidence as a sub-rule
(WHEN can_read(user, doc) where can_read is itself an evidence). Resolution
is a compile-time linker pass: after every evidence config is generated, each
direct reference to an evidence is inlined with that evidence's own (resolved)
config, so the engine evaluates a fully-resolved, acyclic config tree.

- resolveEvidenceReferences(): post-generation pass over evidence configs,
  recursing into logical/defeasible containers (when/unless/never/always/
  requires/union/intersection), always.direct nests, and comparator operands.
- Forward references resolve (all configs exist before the pass runs).
- Cycles and self-references are compile-time errors.
- _subjectAsObject scoping is preserved through inlining.
- dependsOn is recomputed after resolution, so partial-graph requirements
  reach transitively through composed evidence.
- buildDirectRule/buildPredicateRule now apply subject-scoping to top-level
  PredicateCall evidence bodies (latent gap, previously missed).
- validation: reject relation names shared across facts/sources/evidence/
  measures (a collision silently overwrote configs and read as a false cycle).

Tests: EvidenceComposition (9), DSLRuntime transitive requiredFacts, oracle
campaign composition construct, illegal-mutations cycle + cross-kind cases.

tests/DSLRuntime.test.js

@@ -161,4 +161,31 @@ describe('DSLRuntime', () => {
     rt.addNode('doc:9', 'Doc', {});
     await assert.rejects(() => rt.check('u:1', 'does_not_exist', 'doc:9'), /unknown relation/);
   });
+
+  it('derives transitive required facts through evidence composition', async () => {
+    const dsl = `
+      definition Employee { id: string }
+      definition Doc { id: string }
+      fact *owns(user: Employee, doc: Doc)
+      fact *banned(user: Employee)
+      evidence can_read(user: Employee, doc: Doc) { owns(user, doc) }
+      evidence can_open(user: Employee, doc: Doc) { WHEN can_read(user, doc) UNLESS banned(user) }
+    `;
+    const rt = new DSLRuntime(new Arbiter()).compile(dsl, 'rt-comp');
+    rt.addNode('u:1', 'Employee', {});
+    rt.addNode('doc:9', 'Doc', {});
+    // can_open composes can_read, so its requirements reach through to owns.
+    assert.deepEqual(rt.requiredFacts('can_open'), ['owns', 'banned']);
+    const granted = await rt.check('u:1', 'can_open', 'doc:9', {
+      factProviders: { owns: async () => 0.9, banned: async () => 0 }
+    });
+    assert.equal(granted.possibility, 0.9);
+    assert.equal(granted.reason, 'allow_rule_matched');
+    assert.deepEqual(granted.providedFacts, ['owns', 'banned']);
+    const denied = await rt.check('u:1', 'can_open', 'doc:9', {
+      factProviders: { owns: async () => 0.9, banned: async () => 1 }
+    });
+    assert.equal(denied.possibility, 0);
+    assert.equal(denied.reason, 'defeated_by_unless');
+  });
 });