John Dvorak
4fd4e20bd0
Systemic reliability gap found by the probe sweep: the compiled evaluation paths never emitted the reliability the engine computes. - Compiled _evaluateDirect omitted the relation's reliability, and the chain/multi_hop rules hardcoded reliability: 1.0 — so check() results reported 1.0 for any rule whose decision came through a chain, multi_hop, union, intersection, exclusion, or defeasible combination. - The chain and multi_hop traversals now track per-path reliability (product of edge reliabilities) and report the winning path's value; the compiled and fallback logical operators (union/intersection/exclusion, direct_list fast path, early exits) report the selected child's reliability (max/min child or OWA trace index; exclusion multiplies both legs), and normal-mode defeasible combines base x requires x defeater reliabilities. - The checker's logical fast path dropped collectedValues from union/ intersection/exclusion results; it now passes them through. - MultiHopRule.valueManager was read off relationManager where the real arbiter keeps it on the arbiter — collectValues: true on a multi_hop rule with a value-carrying edge crashed the evaluation (error result, silent denial). Now resolved at the arbiter level with a relationManager fallback for stubs. Campaign pins: reliability per kind (chain/multi_hop product, union/intersection selected child, exclusion/defeasible product), and multi_hop value collection through persistent and partial contexts.